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ABSTRACT 
This thesis uses a historical case study approach to examine the impact of context 
on shaping decision making during the conduct of war.  The case analyzed is the war 
between Argentina and Great Britain for control of the Falkland Islands in 1982.  This 
thesis examines the relative strength of the belligerents’ positions using the concepts of 
force, time and space from current operational warfare doctrine and shows that British 
victory in the conflict was by no means a foregone conclusion.  Next, an exploration of 
Argentine conduct of the war highlights and discusses in detail mistakes and errors in 
judgment that had direct impacts on battlefield results.  These decisions are then traced to 
the context in which they were made.  It is this context, specifically the power of limited 
war culture and to a lesser extent the strength of the military polity as a constituency, that 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
What, but a bleak and gloomy solitude, an island thrown aside from 
human use, stormy in winter, and barren in summer; an island which not 
even southern savages have dignified with habitation; where a garrison 
must be kept in a state that contemplates with envy the exiles of Siberia; of 
which the expence will be perpetual, and the use only occasional; and 
which, if fortune smiles upon our labours, may become a nest of 
smugglers in peace, and in war the refuge of future Buccaniers. 
Samuel Johnson (British author 1709-1784, writing about the Falklands)1 
In 1982, Argentina and the United Kingdom fought a short and decisive war in 
the South Atlantic over possession of the islands known as las Islas Malvinas, or the 
Falkland Islands.  Politicians, military planners and warriors on both sides made 
decisions that were good and poor, analyses that were correct and wrong and assumptions 
that were true and false.  In the end, however, it was the United Kingdom that achieved 
an unqualified victory on the battlefield.  Immediately, military professionals and 
scholars began to analyze the factors that had led to the war’s outcome.  The most 
frequent explanation to emerge from this debate is that British military superiority, 
reflected most prominently in their ground forces, simply overwhelmed the capabilities of 
the Argentine forces.  This thesis will show that this was not the case and that, instead, 
poor Argentine conduct of the war was the primary reason for their defeat on the 
battlefield.  While other analysts have pointed to the poor conduct of combat operations 
as the reason for defeat, they most often attribute this to inter-service rivalry.2  However, 
the reality is that poor coordination between the services only played a minor part in 
shaping the outcome.  Instead, the most important factor in the Argentine military’s 
                                                 
1  Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign:  The Origins of the Falklands 
Conflict, (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), 1. 
2 Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign:  The 1982 Falklands War and It's 
Aftermath, (London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2005).  Nora Kinzer Stewart, Mates & 
Muchachos: Unit Cohesion in the Falklands, (Washington D.C.: Brassey's (US), 1991).  Martin 
Middlebrook, The Argentine Fight for the Falklands, (Barnsley, UK: Pen & Sword Military Classics, 
2003).  Duncan Anderson, The Falklands War 1982, (Oxford, United Kingdom: Osprey Publishing, 2002), 
15-16. 
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defeat was the context in which critical decisions about the conduct of the war were 
made. This context involves a ‘limited war culture’, the effect of which was magnified by 
the importance of the senior military leadership as a constituency to which the junta was 
beholden.   
A detailed analysis of the forces engaged, the geography of the battle space, and 
the conduct of operations reveals that the British held a definitive advantage in the quality 
of their ground forces.  However, in the realm of air and naval forces the Argentines 
achieved parity with the British in many aspects and advantages in others.  The 
geography of the battle space gave the Argentines a superior position relative to the 
British.  The islands were much closer to Argentina and the nature of the islands forced 
the British to operate far from any bases or support facilities.  Additionally, the 
operational factor of time aided the Argentine cause much more than the British.  The 
impending arrival of winter in the South Atlantic was a pivotal factor in all aspects of 
military operations in the theater.  The British edge in the quality of their ground forces 
was not sufficient to explain the outcome of the war.  The Argentine conduct of the war 
and decisions regarding their employment of available forces played a much more 
decisive role in determining the result.  Understanding the factors that drove these 
decisions is the key to explaining the Argentine military defeat.  Specifically, it is 
necessary to examine the political motivations of the Junta and rivalries between the three 
services as a driving factor in poor decisions.  Each of these three explanations, British 
ground force superiority, Argentine conduct of the war, and motivations and fractures 
within the military leadership will be examined in detail.  This examination will illustrate 
that these explanations for the outcome of the war are insufficient to explain the outcome 
of the war.  
The Argentines exhibited a limited war culture that was representative of a larger 
Latin American trend regarding military forces and their employment. This culture 
dominated ideas in Argentina about the conduct of military operations.  Specifically, their 
war-fighting culture encompassed decisions about when to go to war, the employment of 
offensive or defensive strategies, acceptable casualty levels and the national “theory of 
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victory.”3  The decisions of the Junta forced the military into conducting combat 
operations with severe restrictions that crippled their effectiveness.  Equally important, 
the Argentine junta was obligated to a constituency which did not have military victory in 
the Falklands as its highest priority.  In the end, although material advantage could not be 
claimed by either side, while the positional advantage was decidedly in the favor of 
Argentina, the atmosphere in which pivotal Argentine decisions were made had such a 
deleterious effect on the quality of those decisions that the British won the war with 
apparent ease. 
A.  BACKGROUND 
1.  The Falkland Islands 
The Falkland Islands are composed of approximately eight hundred islands lying 
in the South Atlantic Ocean.4  The two largest are East and West Falkland and they 
represent the bulk of the approximately 4,700 square miles of land in the islands, an area 
that is roughly the size of the state of Connecticut.5  The islands are located about 250 
miles from the coast of Argentina.6  Lying about 800 miles south of the Falklands is 
South Georgia and a further 500 miles are the South Sandwich Islands, both of which 
would also play a role in war.7  The largest city and capital of the islands is Port Stanley, 
which lies just under 7,800 miles from the United Kingdom and 1,140 miles from Buenos 
Aires.8  Lying at 51 degrees south latitude, the islands are exposed to the harsh weather 
of the southern Atlantic and the winter brings ample evidence that the Antarctic is not far 
                                                 
3  Christopher Twomey, "Chinese Doctrines as Strategic Culture:  Assessing Their Effects," Strategic 
Insights IV, no. 10 (2005). 
4 The British refer to the islands as the Falkland Islands and the Argentines as las Islas Malvinas.  For 
simplicity and consistency this paper will refer to them as the Falkland Islands.  This is not intended to 
reflect any normative judgment on the sovereignty dispute. 
5  "CIA World Factbook," in Central Intelligence Agency, 
https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html, [Last Accessed September 2007]. 
6  Freedman, The Origins of the Falklands Conflict, 1. 
7  Ibid., 1. 
8  Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War : the Falklands Conflict of 
1982, (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1991), xxiii. 
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away.  The log of a ship returning to Spain in 1540 described the islands as “bare with 
not a bit of wood, very windy and very cold, because eight months in the year it snows 
and prevailing winds are south-west.”9  Due largely to its location and the realities of 
geography, there is no arable land on the islands and the primary economic activity at the 
time of the conflict was sheep farming.10  In 1982, there were approximately 1,800 
people living on the Falklands.11  The overwhelming majority of these were British 
citizens known as ‘kelpers’, but there were a handful of Argentines, Chileans and 
Americans living in the 589 residential buildings on the islands.12  In 1982, these people 
would find themselves at the center of the world’s attention. 
2.  Origins of the Dispute 
The British connection to the Falkland Islands dates to 1690. While sailing to 
Chile, poor weather forced Captain John Strong into the vicinity of the islands, which he 
explored and named for the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Falkland.13  The earliest 
settlements on the islands were established in the 1760s.  First, the French under the 
leadership of Antoine de Bougainville established Port Louis in 1764.14  Two years later, 
in January of 1766, the commander of the British ship HMS Jason, John McBride 
founded a settlement at Saunders Island near the coast of West Falkland.15  There is 
evidence that these two settlements existed in ignorance of each other.16  However, an 
agreement between France and Spain signed on October 4, 1766 transferred the islands to 
Spanish control.17  It was this agreement that led to the first militarized dispute over 
ownership of the islands.   
                                                 
9  Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, 1st American ed., (New York: 
Norton, 1983), 1. 
10  Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook. 
11  Hastings and Jenkins,  1. 
12  Freedman, Origins of the Falklands Conflict, 2. 
13  Hastings and Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, 2. 
14  Freedman, Origins of the Falklands Conflict, 4. 
15  Ibid., 5. 
16  Hastings and Jenkins, 3.  Freedman, The Origins of the Falklands Conflict, 5. 
17  Hastings and Jenkins, 4.  
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Figure 1.    Satellite Image of the Falklands18 
 
Furious that the British refused to leave the islands, the Spanish dispatched nearly 
1,500 soldiers and five warships that ejected the British settlers in June of 1770.19  As the 
two sides prepared for war, Spain acquiesced to British demands and allowed for the 
settlement at Saunders Island to be reestablished. Then, in 1774, the British voluntarily 
withdrew from the islands, however, as the settlers departed a plaque was left behind with 
the following inscription: 
Be it known to all nations that the Falkland Islands, with this fort, the 
storehouses, wharfs, harbours, bays and creeks thereunto belonging are the 
sole right and property of His Most Sacred Majesty George the Third, 
King of Great Britain, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, etc. In  
 
                                                 
18 Image from NASA (In the public domain). 
19  Freedman, Origins of the Falklands Conflict, 5. 
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witness whereof this plaque is set up, and His Britannic Majesty’s colours 
left flying as a mark of possession.  By S.W.Clayton, Commanding 
Officer at Falkland Islands, AD 1774.20 
For the next four decades the islands existed as a colony of Spain and free from 
international attention.  On July 9, 1816, the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata, later to 
become Argentina, declared their independence from Spain and claimed all the territorial 
rights of Spain.  A small Argentine outpost operated on the islands with little notice until 
June of 1829.  The appointment of Louis Vernet as governor of the islands in 1829 
renewed British interest.21  A formal protest was issued by the British on November 19, 
1829 arguing that the Argentine Republic had “assumed authority incompatible with His 
Britannick [sic] Majesty’s rights of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.”22  However, it 
was another matter that precipitated the British return to the islands.  Governor Vernet 
began to enforce fishing regulations in the islands and seized three American vessels.23  
In response, the American warship USS Lexington, under the command of Silas Duncan, 
sailed to the islands “landed, destroyed all military installations, razed the buildings, 
seized sealskins, put most inhabitants under arrest and then left, declaring the Islands free 
of all government.”24  Seizing upon the confused situation, the British dispatched HMS 
Tyne and HMS Clio to the region and Clio’s commander, Captain Onslow, raised the 
British flag over the islands on January 3, 1833.25  Thus began a long-standing dispute 
between the United Kingdom and Argentina over who was the rightful owner of the 
Falkland Islands. The British flag would fly over the Falklands until April 2, 1982, when 
Argentine forces lowered it; the change was brief and by June 14th, the Union Jack once 
again flew over the Falklands. 
                                                 
20  Freedman, The Origins of the Falklands Conflict, 6. 
21  Hastings and Jenkins, 5. 
22  Freedman, The Origins of the Falklands Conflict, 7. 
23  Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, xxxi. 
24  Freedman, Origins of the Falklands Conflict, 7. 
25  Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, xxxii. 
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3.  The Dispute Leading Up to the War 
The dispute over the Falkland Islands simmered in Argentina from 1833 on, 
becoming an integral part of the national image.  The issue reemerged on an international 
scale in 1964 when the United Nations Committee on Decolonization added the islands to 
its list of “territories that ought to be decolonized.”26  Additionally, the committee agreed 
to the Argentine demand that ‘Malvinas’ be added to the official description of the 
islands.27  The long-standing dispute over the islands received official recognition with 
the passing of Resolution 2065 in the United Nations’ General Assembly, by a vote of 45 
to zero, with 14 abstentions, on December 16, 1965.28  The resolution invited 
the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland to proceed without delay with the negotiations 
recommended by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to 
the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to 
Colonial Countries and Peoples with a view to finding a peaceful solution 
to the problem, bearing in the mind the provisions and objectives of the 
Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 
(XV) and the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands 
(Malvinas).29 
This resolution became the foundation for 17 years of negotiations that proved to be 
largely fruitless. 
The sticking point for the British was the issue of self-determination.  From their 
perspective it was the ‘wishes’ of the islanders that had to be considered first and 
foremost.  For the most part, the population of the islands “although small, was content” 
and “had no desire to see a change in status.”30  The Argentines took a more literal view 
of Resolution 2065 and insisted that it was the ‘interests’ of the islanders and not their 
‘wishes’ which should dominate the discussion.  Some progress was made including an 
                                                 
26  Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, , 7. 
27  Ibid., 7. 
28  Freedman, Origins of the Falklands Conflict, 20. 
29  "General Assembly Resolution 2065," United Nations, http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/3892395.html, [Last Accessed September 2007]. 
30  Freedman, Origins of the Falklands Conflict, 21. 
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agreement in 1971 that established regular air service between the islands and 
Argentina.31  However, definitive progress on the issue of sovereignty did not develop.  
The lack of movement in negotiations between the countries led to another United 
Nations’ resolution, 3160, adopted by a vote of 99 for and zero against with 14 
abstentions on December 14, 1973.32  Referencing the earlier resolutions, the new 
measure expressed concern that eight years had elapsed without “any substantial progress 
having been made in the negotiations.”  It went on to declare the need to “accelerate 
negotiations” and urged the countries to “proceed without delay with the negotiations.”33  
Despite renewed vigor on the part of both countries, the following decade failed to see 
the development of real progress.  The arrival of a new Argentine government in late 
1981 began the final act of negotiations. 
On December 8, 1981 a new junta seized power in Argentina.  It was led the 
commander of the Army, General Leopoldo Galtieri who was joined by the heads of the 
Navy and Air Force, Admiral Jorge Anaya and General Lami Dozo.34  Within weeks of 
taking power the junta issued National Strategy Directive 1/82. 
The Military Committee, faced with the evident and repeated lack of 
progress in the negotiations with Great Britain to obtain recognition of our 
sovereignty over the Malvinas, Georgias and South Sandwich Islands; 
convinced that the prolongation of this situation affects national honour, 
the full exercise of sovereignty and the exploration of resources; has 
resolved to analyse the possibility of the use of military power to obtain 
the political objective.  This resolution must be kept in strict secrecy and 
should be circulated only to the heads of the respective military 
departments.35 
Ironically, the crisis would be brought to a head far from the Falklands on the rugged 
Island of South Georgia.  The British were outraged by the actions of an Argentine 
merchant, Constantino Davidoff, who was attempting to scrap an abandoned whaling 
                                                 
31  Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse,  8. 
32  Freedman, Origins of the Falklands Conflict, 30. 
33  "United Nations General Assembly Resolution 3160," United Nations, http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/6413810.html. 
34  Freedman, The 1982 Falklands War and It's Aftermath, 153. 
35  Freedman, The 1982 Falklands War and It's Aftermath, 154. 
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station for the raw materials.  After failing to comply with British visa entry procedures, 
raising the Argentine flag over South Georgia and the arrival of both British and 
Argentine military forces in the vicinity of the island, things reached the boiling point.36 
At 715 p.m. on the evening of Friday March 26, 1982, the junta ordered the invasion of 
the Falkland Islands; the war had begun.37 
B. THE WAR 
At about 11 p.m. on the night of April 1, 1982, the first Argentine military forces, 
92 marines from the Amphibious Commando Company, landed on East Falkland near 
Lake Point.38  The next morning, the invasion elements began to land in force.  At 930 
a.m. on the morning of April 2, faced with an overwhelming Argentine force, the 
Governor of the Falklands, Rex Hunt, surrendered.39  Reaction to the bold move by the 
Argentines was swift.  British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had received last minute 
intelligence reports of the impending invasion and “shortly after midnight on 1/2 April, 
orders began pouring out of the Ministry of Defence to warships, the Royal Marines and 
to squadrons of the Royal Air Force;” a task force was dispatched to the South Atlantic 
with all possible haste.40  On April 3, a coordinating operation landed Argentine forces 
on South Georgia via helicopter and they were able to quickly compel the Royal Marine 
detachment at Grytviken to surrender.41  That same day, the United Nations’ Security 
Council adopted Resolution 502.  The vote was 10 in favor, one opposed (Panama) and 
four against (China, Poland, Spain and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics).42  The 
resolution contained three critical clauses.  First, it demanded the “immediate cessation of 
hostilities.”  Second, it required the “immediate withdrawal of all Argentine forces from 
                                                 
36  Anderson, 15-16.  Freedman, The 1982 Falklands War and It's Aftermath, 186. 
37  Ibid., 187. 
38  Middlebrook,  26. 
39  Anderson, 20. 
40  Ibid., 21. 
41  Ibid., 21. 
42  "United Nations Security Council Resolution 505,"  United Nations, http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/9853788.html, [Last Accessed September 2007]. 
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the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas).” Finally, it called on the governments of Argentina 
and Great Britain to “seek a diplomatic solution to their differences.”43  While this was a 
major diplomatic victory for the British, it did very little to remedy the situation. 
In the weeks that followed the armed forces of both Great Britain and Argentina 
began to deploy large forces to the area around the Falkland Islands.  The first Argentine 
troops to reinforce the islands were the 8th Regiment which left its barracks at Comodoro 
Rivadavia and began movement via aircraft on the 6th of April.44  By the end of April, 
Argentina had deployed three (III, IX, and X) of its nine brigades of front-line army 
troops, along with significant marine forces to the Falklands.45  Meanwhile, a large 
British task force consisting of three nuclear powered submarines, more than 4,000 
ground troops, two aircraft carriers and nearly thirty other ships were racing toward the 
South Atlantic from all over the globe.46  The Argentine forces would be commanded by 
Brigadier General Mario Menéndez and the British Task Force was technically 
commanded by Admiral Sir John Fieldhouse, the Royal Navy Commander-in-Chief 
Fleet, but in actuality, Rear Admiral John ‘Sandy’ Woodward would lead the operation to 
recover the Falklands.47 
                                                 
43 "United Nations Security Council Resolution 505,"  United Nations, http://daccess-
ods.un.org/TMP/9853788.html, [Last Accessed September 2007]. 
44  Middlebrook, 47. 
45  Ibid., 47-56. 
46  Freedman, The 1982 Falklands War and it's Aftermath, 50-54. 
47  Anderson, 27, 29. 
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Figure 2.   HMS Sheffield on fire after being hit by Exocet missile.48 
 
Fire between the two forces was first exchanged on April 25.  British helicopters 
forced the Argentine submarine Santa Fe to beach on South Georgia.49  Later, Royal 
Marines landed on the island and the Argentine defenders surrendered.50  The next 
dramatic moment in the conflict came during the afternoon of May 2.  The British nuclear 
powered submarine HMS Conqueror torpedoed and sank the Argentine cruiser General 
Belgrano; this proud ship had been commissioned into the United States Navy as the 
USS Phoenix on October 3, 1938.51  Three years later, she survived the Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii and served throughout the Pacific Theater for the balance of 
                                                 
48  "Official Website of the Royal Navy,"  Ministry of Defense, http://www.royal-
navy.mod.uk/server/show/ConMediaFile.25062#, [Last Accessed September 2007]. 
49  Anderson, ,8. 
50  Ibid., 8. 
51  Anderson, 38. 
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World War II.52  In an ironic twist of fate, the British torpedo fired from HMS Conqueror 
that sent the Belgrano to the bottom was a Mark 8, also of World War II vintage.53  On 
the 4th of May, the Argentines hit back, striking HMS Sheffield with an Exocet anti-ship 
missile, eventually causing her to sink.54  In the opening salvos of the war, each side had 
lost a ship. 
Over the following three weeks, the Argentine and British forces engaged in a 
battle to gain control of the seas and air around the Falklands.  However, neither side was 
able to inflict significant damage on the other, nor was any meaningful advantage gained 
by either side.  On May 21, 1982, about 4,000 British troops landed on the northern coast 
of East Falkland at a place called San Carlos Water.55  The days after the landing saw 
some of the most ferocious fighting of the war.  The Argentines mounted a series of air 
attacks against British shipping that, although uncoordinated, were able to inflict 
substantial damage, sinking six more ships and damaging more than a dozen others.56  At 
the same time, British land forces were fighting their way across East Falkland.  After 
sharp battles at Goose Green on May 28th, Mount Longdon on June 11th and Mount 
Tumbledown on the 13th and 14th of June, the British had routed the Argentine defenders.  
On June 13, 1982, General Menéndez surrendered nearly 12,000 men under his 
command.57 Less than two and half months after the Argentine invasion, the Falkland 
Islands had been retaken by British forces. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Understanding the course of events that led up to the war and the unfolding of the 
battles that ensued is important to frame any discussion of the broader issues at play.  Sir 
Lawrence Freedman wrote the sanctioned history of the conflict for the British in The 
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Official History of the Falklands Campaign58 which is presented in two volumes, the first 
focusing on the history of the conflict over the islands and the second on the 1982 war.  
He later teamed up with Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse to examine the political and 
diplomatic signals exchanged between the belligerents in more detail.59  Further general 
history of the combat events that took place can be found in The Battle for the 
Falklands.60  Several key commanders of British forces have also written about their 
experiences in the Falklands in works that accurately portray the combat that occurred:  
Admiral Sandy Woodward, the naval task force commander61,  Julian Thompson, the 
commander of 3 Commando Brigade62, and Ian Inskip, an officer onboard HMS 
Glamorgan63.  Argentine perspective on the operations is admirably addressed by Martin 
Middlebrook’s The Argentine Fight for the Falklands.64  This work is especially valuable 
because it draws upon significant primary sources and several Argentine books in 
Spanish, including:  Dios y los Halcones, Malvinas—La Defensa de Puerto Argentino, 
Comandos en Accion and Testimonio de su Gobernador.65 Additional insight into the 
origins of the conflict can be found in Virginia Gamba’s The Falklands/Malvinas War: A 
Model for North-South Crisis Prevention66and a U.S. Army War College paper by Sergio 
Fernandez.67 
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There is a large amount of literature that emphasizes the superiority of the British 
forces sent to the Falklands.  Stewart emphasizes the long tradition of British military 
excellence and expounds on the importance of rigorous training for British forces.68  
Martin Middlebrook quotes several Argentine soldiers whose close encounters with 
British ground forces emphasized their ascendancy.69  Even the British task force 
commander writes about the relative capacity of the belligerent forces.70  However, is the 
superiority of British forces a sufficient explanation for the outcome of the war?  Upon 
close examination, it is not.  Milan Vego goes to extraordinary lengths to describe the 
complex nature of modern military operations as defined by three critical factors and 
force is only one of the three.71  Chapter 2 analyzes the belligerents in terms of these 
factors – force, time and space – in order to gain a much better appreciation of the 
relative strength of the opposing sides at the start of hostilities.   It shows that Argentina 
could have won the war, but important decisions were made that undermined their 
chances. This analysis is supported by intelligence analyses and the opinions of various 
political leaders in Britain and the United States which suggest that, at the outset at least, 
the outcome of the war was very much in doubt.72  
The junta’s strategic missteps can be grouped into three areas: employment of 
naval forces, selection and deployment of ground forces and uncoordinated air attacks on 
the British task force.  While these will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3, they can 
be summarized here. Following the sinking of the General Belgrano by the British 
submarine HMS Conqueror the Argentine Navy failed to engage or challenge British 
control of the sea.73 For example, the Argentines had three very capable diesel electric 
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submarines available that they failed to employ in a meaningful manner. 74  Prime 
Minister Thatcher understood the importance of the Argentine Navy being removed from 
the equation in the South Atlantic. 75  The selection and deployment of ground forces to 
the Falklands represent another set of critical decisions.  Despite outnumbering the 
British assault force by a substantial margin, the Argentine ground troops were not 
adequately prepared to repulse the attack. 76  However, the very best Argentine troops 
were not deployed to the Falklands, troops specifically trained and equipped for fighting 
in cold, mountainous terrain. 77  The Argentine officer chosen to command the defenders 
of the Falklands was chosen largely for political expediency rather than combat 
prowess.78   Finally, Argentine Special Forces were delayed in their deployment and 
poorly employed.79  The uncoordinated employment of Argentine aircraft against the 
British task force eliminated the best chance to stop the invasion and repulse the entire 
force.80  Even General Menendez lamented the poor coordination and execution of air 
attacks in theater.81  Compounding the uncoordinated employment of air forces was the 
Argentine failure to extend the runway at Stanley thus allowing the operation of high-
performance aircraft from the islands.82   
Understanding why so many errors were made by the Argentine leadership 
requires an examination of the context in which their decisions were made.  There are 
ample sources that cite the desire of the junta to divert attention from domestic problems 
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as a primary motivator for the invasion. 83  There is even evidence to suggest that the 
invasion had the desired effect, at least in the short term. 84  However, this explanation 
falls short because it is all but impossible to link the motivations behind the initial 
invasion with the quality of battlefield performance.  Instead, the most important factor 
shaping the junta’s strategic decision-making was the limited war culture that 
predominated among the Argentine military.85  The risk averseness typical of limited war 
culture held particular sway because of the dominance of the senior military leadership of 
the individual services as a constituency to which the junta was almost entirely 
beholden.86  The Argentine case is examined through the lens of literature relating to the 
general topic of strategic culture and its implication on decision making.87 The 
importance of limited war culture in explaining the outcome in the Argentine case points 
to the need to examine the impact of war-fighting culture on battlefield events separate 
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II. ASSESSING THE BELLIGERENTS 
So it is said that if you know others and know yourself, you will not be 
imperiled in a hundred battles; if you do not know others but know 
yourself, you win one and lose one; if you do not know others and do not 
know yourself, you will be imperiled in every single battle. 
Sun Tzu88 
 
Before examining the conduct of the war, errors made by commanders and the 
context in which those errors were made, it is first necessary to assess the military 
situation in the South Atlantic.  If British forces were so superior to their Argentine 
adversaries that the outcome of the war was a forgone conclusion, then there is little point 
in studying the decisions made by the leadership in Argentina.  However, this chapter 
demonstrates that the war for the Falklands could have been a close run contest.  Milan 
Vego’s Operational Warfare will be used as the primary framework for assessing the 
situation in the South Atlantic Theater.89  This work is a primary text for students at the 
United States Naval War College, and as such is a key reference for students of modern 
warfare.90  Vego identifies three operational factors:  “space, time and force in a given 
theater of operations.”91  These three elements will provide the backbone for analyzing 
the relative strength of the Argentine and British positions.  The element of force will be 
examined in terms of ground, naval and air forces.  The elements of time and space are 
not easily manipulated by either side, but play a crucial role in shaping the way that any 
war is fought.  Exploration of the situation will show that both sides were able to claim 
distinct advantages, none of which were overwhelming enough to predestine the war’s 
result. 
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A. FORCE 
The first factor examined will be force.  Force involves physical characteristics 
such as “number of personnel and weapons and equipment, physical mobility, firepower, 
command organization, logistics, and quality of weapons and equipment.”92  These 
characteristics of force are relatively easy to quantify, but there are other important 
attributes to consider that are more difficult to measure.  These include the “human 
elements of a force, specifically leadership, morale, discipline, small-unit cohesion, 
combat motivation, and doctrine.”93  The Argentine and British forces will be compared 
across the three primary service components.  Different command organizations make 
some direct comparisons difficult.  However, by assessing the overall capabilities in 
specific functional areas, a reasonably accurate sense of the situation can be obtained. 
1. Air Forces 
Due to the nature of the theater, a small group of islands surrounded by a very 
large area of open ocean, the air component was vital to both sides during the war.  In 
purely numerical terms, the Argentines held an overwhelming advantage in numbers of 
fixed wing aircraft available for employment.  The total number of Argentine fixed wing 
aircraft employed was 216 against a British total of just 55.94  This was a ratio of almost 
four to one.  Additionally, not all of the British planes were readily employable against 
targets in the Falklands.  The British were able to employ Vulcan bombers in strikes 
against the airfield at Stanley, but the enormous effort required delivered only minimal 
damage.  Early on the morning of May 1, a single Vulcan bomber of the Royal Air Force 
101 Squadron, flown by Flight Lieutenant Martin Withers, attacked the airfield at 
Stanley.95  It was “an epic flight from Ascension Island which involved seventeen air-to-
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air refueling operations outward and inbound.”96  While this certainly was an asset for the 
British, its impact was very limited.  With land based aircraft constrained by the distance 
from friendly bases, the British were forced to rely on the Sea Harriers (SHAR) deployed 
onboard their two aircraft carriers, HMS Invincible and HMS Hermes.  When the carriers 
departed from Britain, they carried just eight and twelve Harriers respectively.97  
Although they would later be reinforced, the new numbers were barely sufficient to make 
up for combat losses and aircraft that were not operational due to maintenance issues.  
Against this, the Argentines had an inventory of approximately 65 American made A-4 
Skyhawks, 36 Israeli made Daggers (essentially the same aircraft at the French built 
Mirage V), 14 French built Mirage III, and six British built Canberra bombers.98  
Additionally, the Argentine Navy had five Super Etendards, capable of carrying the 
Exocet anti-ship cruise missile.99  In terms of numbers, the Argentines held an 
overwhelming advantage in fixed wing aircraft. 
Some of the Argentine advantage in numbers was offset by British technological 
superiority.  Most notably, the British Harriers were equipped with the latest ‘Lima’ 
variant of the AIM-9 Sidewinder missile.100  Writing in 1991, Admiral Sandy 
Woodward, commander of the British Task Force remarked, “the new American 
Sidewinder air-to-air missile was one of the most decisive weapons in the combat above 
the ground, and over the ocean.”101  The Admiral communicated to his superiors the 
advantages of the new missile in offsetting the performance and numerical superiority of 
the Argentine aircraft. 
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Mirage kills to date have been with AIM 9L with firings at extremities or 
outside expected 9G brackets.  Live combat has proved that SHAR needs 
improved performance of the AIM 9L to counter Mirage speed 
superiority. It is essential that further Sidewinders supplied are Lima 
variant. 102 
Despite this edge in air-to-air weaponry, the British were still at a distinct disadvantage.  
The Argentines could afford to absorb significant combat losses and still maintain a 
greater number of aircraft in the theater.  However, the British numbers were so limited 
that losses due to combat, weather or maintenance issues would severely degrade their 
capability to gain sufficient control of the air to launch an invasion. 
 
 
Figure 3.   Royal Navy Sea Harriers103 
2. Naval Forces 
The navies of Great Britain and Argentina differed dramatically on the eve of the 
war. When the war started the Argentine Navy was comprised of a number of ships that 
had been built before World War II, operating alongside modern warships that boasted 
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the newest innovations in weaponry.  Representing the older ships was the flag ship of 
the fleet, the General Belgrano.  On the opposite end of the naval spectrum, the 
Argentine fleet boasted the destroyers Santisima Trinidad and Hercules.  These latter two 
ships were Type 42 expeditionary destroyers, designed and built by Vickers Shipbuilding 
and Engineering, Ltd. in the United Kingdom.104  These ships were first-rate warships, 
the Royal Navy task force that sailed from the Britain boasted five sister ships in its 
company, HMS Cardiff, HMS Coventry, HMS Exeter, HMS Glasgow and HMS 
Sheffield.105  The remainder of the Argentine naval surface forces represented a similar 
mix, old and new.  Three new French built A69 frigates were available for service and as 
many as 14 of the ships in the Argentine surface fleet were capable of carrying the Exocet 
missile.106  The Argentines also had one aircraft carrier, the Veinticinco de Mayo, 
originally built for the Royal Navy in 1945, she was capable of carrying A-4 Skyhawks, 
S-2 Trackers and Sea King helicopters.107  The British assessed that the carrier would 
only be able to carry out “limited air-to-air and air-to surface operations in good weather 
conditions.”108  This surface fleet was not as large as the Royal Navy, but it was capable 
and Admiral Woodward understood the Argentines to have “surface, underwater and air 
capability and that their fleet was substantial.”109  
Argentina also had submarine forces available for operations in the Falklands 
War.  Intelligence reports indicate that the Argentines had four serviceable submarines 
available for tasking and at least three were operating in or near the theater at the time of 
the war.110  Of these, it was the two German made Type 209s, Salta and Santa Fe, that 
most concerned the British.  The tracking and destroying of these submarines was the 
highest priority for British nuclear-powered attack submarines as they were “causing 
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much concern to Admiral Woodward and his staff, as well as to the war cabinet.111  
These submarines were extremely capable and “were acoustically superior to a number of 
the British nuclear hunter-killers.”112  During the war, the British were never able to 
confirm that an Argentine submarine had conducted an attack on their surface forces.  
Most compelling however, is the fact that their mere presence at sea created uncertainty 
and at least once, “British ships were forced to abandon shore bombardment of the 
Falklands when their anti-submarine warfare assets detected a possible subsurface 
contact.”113   
The force that opposed the Argentines was Great Britain’s Royal Navy.  Only the 
portion of the Royal Navy that were committed to the action in the South Atlantic will be 
examined, as large portions of the fleet were committed to operations elsewhere that did 
not impact the fight for the Falklands.  The British deployed two aircraft carriers, the 
larger HMS Hermes and the smaller HMS Invincible.  They were accompanied by a large 
number of destroyers and frigates, including one Type 82 destroyer, two County Class 
frigates, the five Type 42 destroyers that were sister ships to the Argentine’s Santisima 
Trinidad and Hercules, two Type 22 frigates, seven Type 21 frigates, four Leander Class 
frigates and two Rothesay Class frigates.114  In addition, the British deployed a total of 
five nuclear powered attack submarines and one diesel-electric boat.  Additionally, eight 
amphibious warfare and landing ships were dispatched as part of the group.115  Finally, 
there were nearly 60 vessels serving as Royal Fleet Auxiliaries, troop transports or 
STUFT (Ships Taken Up from Trade).116  These vessels were responsible for moving the 
enormous amount of supplies required to maintain the task force as well as providing 
non-combat services such as refueling and towing.  The British held an advantage in 
numerical and technological terms; their fleet was in the top tier of the world’s navies.  
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However, intelligence estimates received from the U.S. Navy indicated that the Argentine 
Navy maintained “technical proficiency” along with “high levels of training and 
professionalism.”117  A pitched battle at sea was unlikely, but the Argentine naval forces 
were fully capable of harassing the British, inflicting significant losses and making it 
difficult, if not impossible, for the latter to land troops on the Falklands. 
3. Ground Forces 
Comparisons between the air and naval forces of the belligerents reveal some 
level of parity and advantages held by both sides.  However, in the realm of ground 
forces, no such parity existed.  The Argentine ground forces sent to defend the Falklands 
were no match for the British sent to retake the islands.  The British inherited a military 
tradition of exceptional war-fighting that spanned the centuries, encompassing: “The 
Charge of the Light Brigade, the Crimea, the Khyber Pass, Waterloo, Trafalgar, the 
Somme, Ypres, Flanders Field, Dunkirk, the Battle of Britain, Burma, Arnhem, Borneo, 
Aden, Belfast.”118 These were the warriors of a society that has a bellicose history and a 
war-fighting tradition grounded on extensive victory in combat.  The nature of the British 
military was such that long periods of service are common, most leaders serve a 
minimum of nine years and even the lowliest soldier’s term of service was at least four 
years.119  Indeed, the intensity of training that the British practiced while on ships sailing 
for the Falklands is a telling demarcation of the difference between the forces.  The 
troops ran so much around the decks of the ships that the “ship’s plating began to loosen 
and pop.”120  Even more impressive than the physical training that the British forces 
endured was the quantity of weapons training that they conducted.  During the task 
force’s brief “two-week stopover at Ascension Island, British troops used thirty-seven 
and a half years of training allowance of ammunition in their two-week practice 
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sessions.”121  Clearly, the British forces were preparing for the deadly business ahead.  
This stands in sharp contrast to the experience of an Argentine conscript who said “no 
one had taught me how to shoot.”122 
The superiority of the British military was nowhere more evident than in the 
infantry that the British were able to land on the Falklands.  Numerous observations by 
Argentine military personnel indicate that they knew their adversaries were a better 
fighting force.  Lieutenant-Colonel Piaggi commanded the Argentine defenders at the 
Battle of Goose Greene.  In preparing for the British assault he observed: 
I did not think that we could hold out for long, particularly because of my 
reading of British military history, which showed that they would attack 
with skill and with at least the necessary strength—and probably more.  I 
had read all about that in books on the Second World War.123 
When the British attacked early on the morning of May 28, they relied on their “superior 
tactical training to overcome the dangers of operating in the bare Falklands terrain.”124  It 
is a telling statistic that the 450 British infantrymen who attacked the Argentines at Goose 
Greene took approximately 1500 prisoners.125  Javier Pereda was a radio operator on the 
Argentine hospital ship Almirante Irizar which transported wounded Argentine soldiers 
back to the mainland.  After speaking with several wounded soldiers, he remarked that 
“they had a high regard for the professionalism of the British; it was as though the British 
were fighting a different war.”126  Even the British task force commander understood the 
qualitative advantage that his forces enjoyed, writing in his journal with a sense of relief 
that “Argentina doesn’t breed bulldogs.”127   
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U.S. Army sociologist Nora Kinzer Stewart has written extensively about the 
contrasts between the Argentine and British forces that fought in the Falklands War.  Her 
book, Mates and Muchachos: Unit Cohesion in the Falklands/Malvinas War, examines in 
some detail the qualitative differences between the Argentine and British forces deployed 
to the Falklands.  The divergence she observed in their training hints at why British 
ground forces seemed to win with such ease.   
British officers believe in subjecting their men in training conditions to 
expect the unexpected.  Sometimes meals don’t arrive.  Sometimes 
ammunition runs out.  Officers continually test their men and push them 
beyond what the trainee or soldier think is his limit.128 
This stands in stark contrast with the force that these soldiers would face.   
With few exceptions, the Argentine Army did not train it men or prepare 
them for the battle ahead.  In the Falklands, officers and NCOs had to 
show their completely untrained troops how to handle and fire their 
weapons and to dig their foxholes.  Their training was confused at best.129 
This training made a large impact once British ground forces were ashore in the 
Falklands.  The weather was cold and miserable throughout the campaign and the loss of 
the Atlantic Conveyor meant that helicopter transport was not available, forcing the 
troops to march from San Carlos Water to Stanley. 
B.  TIME 
In the conduct of warfare, time “is one of the most precious commodities.”130  
The factor of time should be considered to be relatively fixed, it can be helpful or harmful 
to the operational commander, but cannot easily be manipulated to conform to the 
commander’s intentions.131  For all sides in a war, the unstoppable march of time impacts 
operations and planning.  For a defending force, in this case the Argentines, the goal 
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should be to “delay the decision as long as possible.”132  Conversely, for attacking forces, 
the British, “it is critically important that his actions be as short as possible.”133  In terms 
of the offensive and defensive, time favored the Argentines, but this was not the only 
manner in which time was their ally.   
Time relative to the weather was also on the Argentine side.  The Argentines 
seized the Falklands during autumn of the Southern Hemisphere and hostilities concluded 
as winter was arriving.  The South Atlantic winter would have precluded many of the 
operations that the British conducted, including free employment of carrier based aviation 
assets, both fixed and rotary wing, and amphibious landings.  Additionally, the onset of 
winter would have made conditions for ground forces even more miserable than they 
already were.  Admiral Woodward made this abundantly clear when he contended that 
had General Menéndez been able to “spin the land campaign out another ten days… that 
would have finished us, not him.”134  Additional time would also have provided an 
opportunity for the Argentines to reinforce their positions and establish a better defense.  
However, additional time would bring only limited additional forces, particularly naval 
and air for the British.  The bulk of their assets were committed to the task force when it 
sailed and there were no additional forces to add.  Napoleon best described the 
relationship between the commander and time when he told his Marshals, “ask me for 
anything but time.”135  Time can help or hinder a given sides efforts, but it cannot be 
stopped or slowed and thus its value must be quickly recognized and leveraged or any 
possible advantage is lost. 
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C.  SPACE 
The factor of space, like that of force, is complex and encompasses many 
elements including: “land, sea and airspace, including outer space, with all their features, 
which influence employment and effectiveness of land, sea and air forces.”136   
 
 
Figure 4.   Map of Theater137 
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Space, in terms of geography and operational objectives also favored the Argentines.  
The distance from London to Port Stanley is five and a half times greater than the 
distance from Buenos Aires to the Falkland’s capital.138 This meant that every British 
soldier moving to the operational theater required five times as much fuel, took five times 
as long in transit, and inflicted five times as much wear and tear on equipment just to 
arrive in the contested area.  It also meant that every bullet, bandage, meal and 
miscellaneous item of military value had to make the same long journey before a sailor 
on a ship, soldier on the ground or pilot in the air could employ it.  The Argentines were 
also advantageously placed in terms of the operational objective.  They only had to 
defend a small geographic area and every day they did so helped their cause.  On the 
other hand, the British had to attempt to gain air and sea superiority over the area 
surrounding the objective, protect a long supply line, and contend with numerous enemy 
bases near the fight.  Having done these things, they had to conduct an amphibious 
landing that Sir John Fieldhouse described as “the most difficult thing we have attempted 
since the Second World War.”139  Thus, the distinct advantage of the British infantry was 
offset by Argentine parity in terms of naval and air forces.  Additionally, the location of 
the Falkland Islands and the inevitable march of time played to the Argentine advantage. 
Opinions and assessments by American and British experts bear witness to the 
fact that the British victory was not a foregone conclusion.  The really critical point is 
“that Argentina did indeed have reasonable chances of winning a war for the Falklands, a 
view shared by the British, American and Soviet military analysts—and by the 
commander of the British expeditionary forces.”140  Doubts about the outcome of the war 
went all the way to the top of the British government.  Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher 
notes in her memoirs that prior to the Argentine seizure of the Falklands she was advised 
by the defense minister John Nott that the Ministry of Defence’s view was “that the 
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Falklands could not be retaken once they were seized.”141  Alexander Haig believed that 
there was never any doubt of British victory, but tempered his own view by 
acknowledging that “this was not an opinion that was universally held among the White 
House staff, the American military, or intelligence analysts—or even by every 
knowledgeable Briton.”142  These observations highlight the fallacy of the argument that 
British military superiority in ground forces assured them of victory.  It must be 
emphasized that the outcome of the war cannot, in and of itself, be used as the 
explanation for why that outcome occurred.  “The fact that Britain did win this war does 
not imply that it had to win; or that the Argentinian perceptions of their winning chances 
were necessarily mistaken.”143 
The Falklands War was a resounding victory for the British military, but when the 
war began this outcome was not guaranteed.  The location of the battle space gave 
Argentina a massive advantage that the British could do very little to counter.  
Additionally, time was in the favor the Argentines, each day that passed brought the 
South Atlantic’s brutal winter weather closer.  Finally, the Argentine military was 
superior in certain areas and, despite the overwhelming quality of British ground forces, 
could have made the war a much more closely contested affair.  In the end, it was poor 
management of the available assets and failure to capitalize on advantages that cost the 
Argentines the war.  These failures were a result of deliberate decisions made at the 
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III. ARGENTINE CONDUCT OF THE WAR 
No one starts a war--or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so--without 
first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and 
how he intends to conduct it. 
Carl von Clausewitz144 
 
Having established that it was possible, and at the onset even probable, that the 
Argentines could have won the war, it is necessary to examine why they did not.  
Identifying their missteps, mistakes and missed opportunities is critical to understanding 
the battlefield results.  Defeat in the Falklands for Argentina was a product of a series of 
decisions that squandered an initially viable opportunity for a successful military 
campaign.  The most critical aspects of Argentine conduct of the war were crude 
employment of naval forces, the selection of ground forces deployed to garrison the 
islands and the uncoordinated use of air power.  In the naval realm, the loss of the 
Belgrano, the haphazard nature of submarine operations and ultimately the decision to 
withdraw major naval units from the fight were pivotal in shaping the course of the war.  
The ground forces sent to defend the islands, including their commander, did not 
represent the best that Argentina had available and they performed at a requisite level.  
Despite some significant successes against the British, the Argentines were never able to 
mount an air campaign sufficient to cripple the task force’s operations.  When these 
decisions, all of which had a direct impact on the British ability to leverage their 
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A. EMPLOYMENT OF NAVAL FORCES 
Perhaps no aspect of the war better exposes the differences between the British 
and Argentine commanders than their employment of naval forces.  Considering the 
geography of the battle space and the fact that the primary objective was a group of 
islands this was a deciding factor in determining the outcome of operations.   
1. Sinking of the General Belgrano 
One of the most controversial and pivotal actions of the Falklands War was the 
sinking of the General Belgrano by HMS Conqueror.  The Belgrano was the flag-ship 
for Task Group 79.3, under the command of the ship’s captain Héctor Elías Bonzo and 
included the destroyers Bouchard and Piedra Buena.  These escorts were almost as old as 
their charge.  Both had been constructed by the United States as Allen M. Sumner Class 
destroyers in the 1940s and sold to Argentina in the 1970s.145  The Belgrano had no 
sonar fitted and the escort vessels were fitted with the most antiquated of equipment for 
detecting submarines.  Thus, Admiral Anaya had deployed his most prominent surface 
combatant into an environment where British nuclear-powered attack submarines were 
likely to be operating without an adequate ability to detect the threat, let alone defend 
against it.  Such a move was foolhardy, bordering on the negligent.  Certainly, a 
submarine attack, especially outside the exclusion zone was unlikely, but prudent naval 
operations require, at a minimum, the capacity to monitor the operating environment for 
threats. 
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Figure 5.    General Belgrano Sinking146 
 
This attack had immediate tactical and long-term operational significance.  In the 
short-term it was sufficient to disrupt the Argentine’s planned naval movement against 
the British task force.  The attack was to be a two-pronged assault with the Belgrano 
leading the southern element of a pincer and the Argentine aircraft carrier Veinticinco de 
Mayo leading the northern element.147   In the long-term it removed the Argentine navy 
as a significant factor in the war.   
The sinking of the Argentinean cruiser, the Argentinean aircraft carrier’s 
inability to launch an attack or counterattack…broke the back of the 
Argentinean Navy.  The Argentinean task force to the north returned to 
base, where it remained until the end of the war.148 
In spite of the tremendous victory that the British had gained through the employment of 
their submarine, the Argentines did not even attempt to reciprocate. 
2. Submarine Operations 
Two Argentine submarines were operational and available for tasking during the 
war.  Argentina had four submarines in the inventory, the Santa Fe and Santiago del 
                                                 
146 In the public domain. 
147  Edward B. Zellem, "Clausewitz and Seapower: Lessons of the Falkland Islands War" (Ph.D. diss., 
Air Command and Staff College Air University, 1999), 19. 
148  Ibid., 20. 
 34
Estero were Guppy Class diesel powered boats purchased from the United States.  The 
Salta and San Luis were new German made diesel-electric submarines that “were 
acoustically superior to a number off the British nuclear hunter-killers.”149  However, the 
Salta and Santiago del Estero were not available for employment due to maintenance 
issues.150  This left Argentina with one very capable modern diesel electric submarine 
and an older, but still dangerous diesel boat.  However, their combat record was lack-
luster at best.  The Santa Fe was forced to beach in King Edward Cove on South Georgia 
after being attacked by British helicopters on the 25th of April.151  The loss of this asset 
reduced the effective Argentine submarine force to just one.  However, the mission of the 
Santa Fe was the most telling.  She had been sent dispatched “with 20 men and supplies 
to deliver to South Georgia.”152  A vessel that represented a significant threat to the 
British task force had been dispatched for logistics purposes.  Considering that the South 
Atlantic was an extremely difficult area in which to conduct ASW (anti-submarine 
warfare) and the impact of the Argentine submarine threat, this was a waste of a valuable 
asset.  The mere threat of an enemy submarine at sea created uncertainty and at least 
once, “British ships were forced to abandon shore bombardment of the Falklands when 
their anti-submarine warfare assets detected a possible subsurface contact.”153  Instead of 
harassing the British task force, making their operations more difficult and being 
positioned to conduct an attack, the Santa Fe was lost while ferrying supplies far from the 
objective.    
The other operational submarine was more aggressive, but still failed to make a 
substantial impact on the course of the war.  The San Luis, made sonar only contact with 
what she estimated to be a group of Type 42 destroyers and frigates on the 1st of May.  In 
reality, the ships were HMS Brilliant, a Type 22 frigate and HMS Yarmouth, a Type 12I 
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Rothesay Class frigate.  The submarine “closed to about ten thousand yards and at 1005 
fired one SST-4 wire guided torpedo.154  However, the shot was unsuccessful and the San 
Luis was forced to spend almost a full day evading British helicopters sent to attack 
her.155   
The San Luis reported conducting an attack with a Mark 37 torpedo against a 
British submarine on the May 8, but no such attack was recorded by the British.156  The 
final attempt at an attack occurred on May 10th against the destroyers HMS Arrow and 
HMS Alacrity.  A single torpedo was fired, but failed to score a hit.  Later, when Arrow 
retrieved her towed torpedo countermeasure it was damaged.  This was taken as evidence 
that it has successfully deceived the torpedo and thus saved the ship from damage.157  
Ultimately, the San Luis made no discernable impact on British task force operations.  
Her attacks were all directed at assets that were of only minimal value to the enemy.  
There is no indication that submarines were ever ordered to locate and attempt to sink the 
British carriers.  A single torpedo hit on either of the two carriers would likely have 
forced a British withdrawal.  The submarines of the Argentine navy were “poorly used 
and were never ordered to execute the classic hunter-killer mission of attack 
submarines.”158  One of the best opportunities to inflict significant damage was wasted 
by the Argentine high command. 
3. Retreat of the Argentine Navy 
After the sinking of the Belgrano, the Argentine Navy never made a significant 
impact on the war at sea in the vicinity of the Falklands.  In the words of Margaret 
Thatcher, they “skulked in port.”159   
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The Argentine navy could have been employed far more effectively, 
especially in concert with air operations against the British fleet.  
However, after the loss of the Belgrano, Admiral Anaya felt compelled to 
keep his fleet ‘in being’, which really meant ‘in port.’160 
When attempting an amphibious landing operation, an attacking force seeks two areas of 
control, air and sea.  Freedom to operate ships and aircraft in the effort to land forces 
ashore is critical.  The removal of the Argentine surface fleet from the area of operations, 
combined with their substandard attempts at submarine warfare, to give control of the 
seas to the British task force.  This greatly simplified the situation for Admiral 
Woodward and his commanders.  They were able to concentrate their efforts on air 
defense and the movement of troops from ship to shore.  While pulling the fleet back 
inside Argentine mainland waters did indeed preserve it, the move made the assault on 
the Falklands much easier for the British.  They did not have to dedicate assets, time or 
energy to defend against an Argentine surface threat.  So great was the impact of the 
withdrawal of the Argentine Navy from the fight that Admiral Woodward described the 
effects as “all-embracing!”161 
B.  SELECTION OF GROUND FORCES  
The ground forces that Argentina sent to defend the Falklands would bear the 
brunt of the brutality during the war.  They were forced to live outdoors, in miserable 
weather, subjected to bombardment leading up to the landings and finally forced to fight 
the British in a gritty land campaign.  Unfortunately for them and for Argentina’s chances 
of success, they were poorly chosen for their assignment.  In the finally analysis, they 
were woefully unprepared for what they would face. 
1. Failure to Deploy Mountain Troops 
The Argentine defenders on the Falklands outnumbered the British landing force 
by a considerable amount.  By the beginning of May, the Argentine military had 
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deployed between 12,000 and 13,000 men to the Falklands to defend against a British 
assault.162  This is an impressive figure, especially considering that the British attacked 
with only a third of that number.  However, it is not simply a matter of numbers.  The 
quality of the troops employed, their training, equipment and experience also contribute 
to the chances of success.  Though the Argentine defenders were more numerous than the 
British attackers, they “were much less prepared to fight in a forbidding climate.”163  
Argentina had two infantry brigades specifically trained and “equipped for cold-weather 
operations in the extreme south.”164  These were the VI and VIII Mountain Infantry 
Brigades.  However, they were left in garrison near the border with Chile.  In their place, 
III Brigade was sent; these were troops from the northern areas of the country, known for 
their warm, subtropical climate.  This unit was so poorly equipped that the men had to 
visit local stores and purchase field items before boarding aircraft bound for the 
Falklands.  This decision “robbed the Falklands garrison of the most suitable troops for 
fighting in the islands.”165  On the other hand, many of the British forces had extensive 
cold weather training. 
I could never figure out why the hell we were training in the muck and 
goo at Salisbury when we were going to fight in Northern Europe.  Then 
when we were in the Falklands, I said to my mates, ‘Blood Hell! This 
place is just like home.’166 
Given all of the difficulties associated with infantry combat under any conditions, the 
Argentine defense of the Falklands would have been strengthened considerably by the 
addition of troops trained, equipped for and acclimated to operations in cold, 
mountainous conditions. 
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2. Selection of Commander 
The officer chosen to command all Argentine forces in the Falklands was Army 
Brigadier General Mario Benjamín Menéndez, “the fifty-two-year-old commander of the 
Buenos Aires first army corps.”167  The choice was made not based on qualification or 
the probability of military success, but rather on political considerations.  “He had not 
been chosen for his qualities as a fighter but, rather, for a conciliatory temperament that 
would help him govern the Islands.”168  When Vice-Admiral Lombardo sent a message 
to Menéndez on the 8th of April with questions about the progress of military 
preparations on the islands, Menéndez’s reply was “What the hell are you talking 
about?”169  The commander in the Falklands had paid so little attention to the preparation 
of a defense that he didn’t even understand the inquiry by his superior.  Not taking every 
available moment to prepare undermined whatever advantage the Argentines may have 
held regarding the operational factor of force.  In Menéndez’s defense, many Argentine 
leaders did not think that the British would launch an operation to retake the islands.  
However, an aggressive commander with foresight would have taken every available 
opportunity to reinforce his position and prepare for a counterattack.  Even as it became 
obvious that the British would attempt to retake the islands by force, no change was 
made. 
Given the new circumstances, the possibility was considered of replacing 
Menéndez with someone more suited to armed conflict. Galtieri decided 
against.  He felt that it would cause undue anxiety among both the armed 
forces and the Argentine people generally if there were ‘chops and 
changes’ at the top.  In the event, and as he might have predicted, 
Menéndez proved to a less able military commander than political 
governor.170 
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The performance of Menéndez would not improve once the British ground forces were 
ashore.  His static defense of Stanley was unimaginative, outdated and ultimately proved 
to be unsuccessful.  There were ample opportunities for the Argentines to replace 
Menéndez with a commander more suited to the defense of the islands, but the junta 
chose not to. 
3. Deployment and Employment of Special Forces 
Another major mistake made in the ground force selection regarded the 
employment of Argentina’s significant Special Forces capability.  Early in the 
deployment of Argentine military personnel to the Falklands it was nearly impossible to 
remove the organic Special Forces from front line units.  Even when they were 
redeployed into their Special Forces units, they were employed primarily as military 
police, a clear waste of a valuable asset.171  This was most likely done in response to the 
increasingly desperate condition of the Argentine soldiers.  As the conflict wore 
“conscripts became cold, wet and hungry and were reported to have broken into houses 
and stolen food.”172  Well, trained and disciplined troops were required to keep the peace 
and avoid any incidents between the occupying forces and civilians.  Argentina could ill 
afford additional negative publicity in the world press.  However, assets that could have 
been used to slow the British advance were not available.    During the entire campaign, 
only one significant action involving Argentine Special Forces was recorded.  On the 28th 
of May, Argentine Special Forces were tasked with a “plan to plant a north-south screen 
to strike at the British logistics line of communication and to capture British soldiers.”173  
The plan did not work and in the ensuing fire-fight, two Argentines killed and an 
additional five were captured, British forces suffered three wounded.  Much like the use 
of submarines, the Argentine failure to capitalize on the ability of Special Forces to carry 
out unconventional warfare missions vacated an opportunity to score victories against the 
British. 
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C. THE AIR FIGHT 
No single factor played a greater hand in determining the outcome of the war than 
the Argentine failure to inflict sufficient damage on the British task force to force them to 
withdraw prior to the amphibious assault at San Carlos Water.  Once British ground 
forces made their way ashore, the business was bloody, but the conclusion was no longer 
in doubt.  Both scholars and participants have identified the lack-luster performance of 
the Argentine attacks on the task force prior to the landings as a critical factor in the 
British victory. 
1. Successes and Failures 
The combined air assets of the Argentine Navy and Air Force performed 
reasonably well in combat against the British air arm and in attacks against British ships 
they inflicted substantial casualties.  Indeed, the Super Etendards with their Exocet anti-
ship missiles conducted devastating attacks on British shipping, sending HMS Sheffield 
and the transport Atlantic Conveyor to the bottom.174  The successful attack on Sheffield 
would cause “Rear-Admiral Woodward to be more cautious in the use of his ships, 
forcing his task force to keep further from the Exocet threat and also further from the 
Falklands.”175  Additionally, bombing attacks caused serious damage to the frigates 
Ardent and Antelope, the destroyer Coventry and the landing ships Sir Galahad and Sir 
Tristram.176  During the course of the war, Argentine aircraft were also able to cause 
mild to moderate damage to an additional 18 ships.  In all, 25 ships of the British task 
force were either damaged or sunk.  However, this success did not translate into any 
meaningful result.  They were the result of a large number of attacks, against an enemy 
fleet that was extremely vulnerable as it moved in close to shore for amphibious landings.  
Nor were the Argentines able to achieve any air to air kills during the entire war.  The  
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British were able to claim 20 confirmed air to air kills, with an additional three listed as 
‘probable.”177  The British lost 12 aircraft to enemy action and the Argentines 103.178  
Clearly, the British got the better of the air fight.   
 
 
Figure 6.   Argentine Super Etendard Firing Exocet Missile179 
 
The most salient feature of the Argentine attacks is that they rarely involved a 
concentration of aircraft and displayed a pronounced lack of coordination.  General 
Menendez lamented, “our own air attacks are executed in an uncoordinated manner; we 
fail to deliver mass attacks.”180  He urged his superiors to ensure that all future attacks 
“be carried out by a minimum of 8 aircraft, which should arrive simultaneously over the 
Malvinas.”181  However, there is no evidence that future attacks were better coordinated 
or involved larger numbers of attacking aircraft.  Throughout the war, the air attacks 
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never seriously threatened the British carriers.  This was their center of gravity.  Damage 
to, let alone the loss of, either would have crippled the British effort to retake the islands.  
Given the availability of two submarines and a large number of high performance aircraft 
with sophisticated weapons, it was not beyond the capability of Argentina to locate and 
attack the carriers in force. 
2. The Airfield at Stanley 
Whatever advantages the Argentines could claim in terms of aircraft numbers and 
anti-ship weapons were crippled by the fact that Argentine aircraft operated from bases 
on the mainland as much as 800 miles from the operational area, rather than from a 
forward airbase at Stanley.  The runway at Port Stanley was 4,700 feet long, which meant 
it was too short to support high-performance aircraft.  There was enormous concern 
among the British that the Argentines would use steel matting to extend the runway 
allowing their Skyhawk, Mirage and Dagger aircraft to operate from it.  “Argentina had 
ample supplies of steel matting and enough time to ship it to Stanley, but when air force 
engineers studied the practicalities they decided it would be too difficult to sustain high-
performance jet aircraft from such a primitive airfield.”182  This theory was proven 
wrong shortly after the war when the British extended the runway and began to operate 
their own A-4 Skyhawks from Stanley.183  This was one of the primary aircraft in the 
Argentine inventory and the Skyhawks were very successfully employed, even when 
operating at the extreme range of their fuel capacity.  There is no doubt that the “benefits 
of having an ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier’ in the form of a base on the islands could prove 
incalculable.”184  Failure to lengthen the runway at Stanley to accommodate high 
performance aircraft meant that a primary element of the Argentine force, and one of the 
greatest advantages, was hamstrung by the tyranny of distance. 
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Ultimately, the Argentines lost the Falklands War because their leaders failed to 
make correct decisions.  Positional advantages were not exploited, forces for the 
campaign were poorly selected and then misemployed, and key assets were withdrawn 
without ever contributing to the fight.  Argentina’s chances for winning the war grow “if 
one considers counterfactually the role of good generalship, at both the operational and 
grand strategic levels.”185  While Argentine ground forces may have been outclassed by 
their British adversaries, good commanders, dedicated to victory could have successfully 
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IV. DECISION MAKING CONTEXT 
The expedition to Sicily was not so much a mistake in judgment, 
considering the enemy they went against, as much as a case of mis-
management on the part of the planners, who did not afterwards take the 
necessary measures to support those first troops they sent out. Instead, 
they turned to personal rivalries over the leadership of the people, and 
consequently not only conducted the war in the field half-heartedly, but 
also brought civil discord for the first time to the home front...And yet 
they did not fail until they at last turned on each other and fell into private 
quarrels that brought their ruin. 
THUCYDIDES186 
 
Argentine defeat in 1982 was not a forgone conclusion, but rather a product of 
poor management of the war once it actually got underway.  The Argentine military 
leadership failed to capitalize on the country’s advantageous geographical position and 
numerical superiority.  In addition, the employment of key resources was suboptimal.  
Why were these mistakes made?  Were the leaders not smart enough to make the correct 
decisions?  Were these decisions the result of bad information about the situation being 
passed to the leaders?  The answer on both accounts is no.  The decisions of the ruling 
military junta were driven by the context in which they were made, which in turn was 
fundamentally shaped by the war-fighting culture of Argentina.   
The driving force in the junta’s poor decision making was a war-fighting culture 
dominated by the ideas, institutions and doctrine of limited war.  This war-fighting 
culture focused on the threat of internal enemies, involved only a small portion of the 
population and – most critically -- was not prepared to deal with losses of equipment and 
personnel.  The three members of the ruling military junta, Army General Leopoldo 
Fortunato Galtieri Castelli, Air Force Brigadier General Basilio Arturo Ignacio Lami 
Dozo and Navy Rear Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya, were steeped in a limited war culture 
that led to missteps in the use of naval and land forces that seriously undermined the war 
effort.  As importantly, the senior military leadership of each service embraced a limited 
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war culture that valued equipment and personnel as ends in themselves (i.e.,  prestige) 
rather than as means to an end (i.e., victory in war).  This led them to reject any strategic 
decisions that carried the potential of excessive casualties or loss of equipment.  Since 
junta members were subject to replacement at the whim of the senior leadership, they 
were forced to be responsive to the risk-minimizing preferences of the individual 
services.  Taken together, these elements created an environment in which the leadership 
of Argentina issued orders that undermined the ability of forces in the field to fight and 
win.   
This chapter begins by defining the concept of “war-fighting culture,” which is 
typically neglected in much of the literature.   It then describes the limited war culture 
that prevailed in Argentina (and in many other countries of Latin America) and identifies 
the critical missteps made by the junta that can be attributed to this war culture.  The 
second section shows how the structure of decision-making within the regime led the 
junta to be responsive to the limited war culture preferences of the military leadership in 
the individual services and it enumerates the strategic missteps this engendered.  Finally, 
the third section discounts prevailing alternative explanations.  It explains why inter-
service rivalry – a characteristic of the Argentine armed forces most often cited as the 
reason for is defeat in the war – is not responsible for the negative outcome.  
A. LIMITED WAR CULTURE 
Although the term ‘war-fighting culture’ is rarely found in most of the current 
scholarly literature that examines the role of culture in national defense affairs, it is very 
closely related to strategic culture, but with a more pronounced emphasis on the conduct 
of war.  Strategic culture has been investigated primarily for its explanatory power with 
regard to decisions about initiating hostilities, but in this thesis the focus is on decisions 
that affect combat operations.  The two foundational works examining strategic culture 
and limited war, Robert Osgood’s Limited War and Thomas Schelling’s The Strategy of 
Conflict, are perfect examples.187  Both dedicate entire books to studying theories about 
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limited war.  However, they focus on national level decision making and assert that little 
or no knowledge of combat operations is required for the study.  Scott Sigmund Gartner 
emphasizes the lack of scholarly work on war-fighting culture and understanding its 
impact on the conduct of war.188  Understanding combat operations and battlefield effects 
gives concrete meaning to the study of decision making by government leaders.  This 
thesis links the sometimes academic and abstract analysis of national-level decision-
making to the reality of the warriors on the ground.   
In order to do this, the elements of strategic culture that most closely relate to the 
actual conduct of combat operations are examined, and subsequently referred to as ‘war-
fighting culture.’  The most important of these elements are mutually held conceptions of 
national leaders “particularly those concerning decisions to go to war, preferences for the 
offensive, expansionist or defensive modes of warfare and levels of casualties that would 
be acceptable.”189 In short, war-fighting culture is how a nation believes it will win the 
wars that it fights.  The Argentine military and its leaders had been shaped by a limited 
war culture.   
This culture traces its roots to the very origins of the country and its neighbors.  
“The Latin American region was born entire; the countries were each surrounded at birth 
by states very similar in immediate history and even social structure.”190  This is one of 
the major reasons that Latin America has largely been devoid of international wars.  
Unlike the states of Europe, those of Latin America emerged as relatively equal and, 
more importantly, did not rely on the fruits of war during the process of maturing.  While 
militarized border disputes were common and military force was often applied in 
situations of domestic unrest, war with other nations was extremely rare.  In fact, between 
1930 and 2000, there were only five international wars in all of Latin America; the 
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Falklands War was the only one of these in which Argentina was involved.191  Bolivia 
and Paraguay fought the bloody Chaco War between 1932 and 1935; Colombia and Peru 
fought over Leticia during the same timeframe; in 1969, El Salvador and Honduras 
fought the so-called ‘Soccer War’; and, the border dispute between Peru and Ecuador 
flared up in 1941 and 1981 and resulted in a short war in 1995.192  By contrast, the same 
period saw at least 17 major civil wars in the region.193   Even more significant, the same 
period saw at least 87 militarized border disputes that did not escalate into war.194  
This ‘Limited War Culture’ can be outlined by three basic characteristics.  I 
borrow this definition from Miguel Angel Centeno’s excellent work Blood and Debt, 
which examines the relationship between war and the making of nation-states in Latin 
America.  The major difference between this examination and Centeno’s work is the 
focus on the battlefield impact of war-fighting culture.  Centeno’s effort is directed 
exclusively at war-fighting culture’s relationship to state development, as opposed to this 
consideration of war-fighting culture’s relationship to military performance during war.  
Centeno defines a limited war culture as one focused on internal enemies, with a 
consequent failure to train forces to fight the soldiers of other nations.195  Evidence of 
this in the Argentine case can be seen in the very effective employment of the military to 
carry out the ‘dirty war’ against dissidents upon taking power in 1976.  Second, only a 
small portion of the national population has a vested interest and direct involvement with 
the military.196  Finally, the defining characteristic of a ‘limited war culture’ is a lack of 
“historically forged institutional or political appetite for the organizational insanity of 
modern war.”197  This aspect of ‘limited war culture’ cuts to the heart of explaining why 
the military leadership of Argentina was so adverse to accepting losses among their best 
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military units.  Victory in war often requires the sacrifice of significant organizational 
assets; to win a portion of the organization must be lost.  This is most certainly the 
pinnacle of ‘organizational insanity’: accepting massive losses in the hopes of achieving 
victory. 
The impact of this war-fighting culture was evident in the employment of 
submarines and Special Forces during the war.  Submarine warfare is aggressive, 
provocative and extremely violent.  This is not a tactic that can be employed in border 
dispute brinksmanship, nor does it have any value in quelling domestic unrest.  
Therefore, it should not be surprising that the Argentines failed to employ their available 
submarines effectively. They had no experience to draw upon and more importantly the 
challenges that the naval leadership had grown accustomed to meeting did not prepare 
them for an unrestricted submarine campaign.  The idea of Argentina conducting 
unrestricted submarine warfare in the South Atlantic would have been preposterous 
before the Falklands War.  For the British it might have been an equally unlikely 
suggestion, but they had trained for such missions against the Soviet Union for decades.  
A dramatic shift in the employment of these assets would have been very difficult to 
conceptualize, let alone execute for Argentina.  This is because states that “have 
traditionally been peaceful or fought in limited wars may in time find it practically 
impossible to ever consider fighting total wars.”198   
Special Forces are unique; they carry out missions that are beyond the capabilities 
of traditional units.  Their focus is on asymmetric warfare, usually employing small units 
to exploit enemy weaknesses.  Their hallmarks are training and discipline.  In an army 
that was lacking in both of these characteristics, it is not surprising that their presence in 
Special Forces drew the attention of the command authority.  Unfortunately, a valuable 
asset was not directed against the enemy, but used to keep the peace between the 
conscripts and the residents of the Falklands. 199 The link to a long history of using the 
military for domestic security is painfully obvious. 
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The decision about which units to deploy to the Falklands further highlights the 
effects of the limited war culture on the conduct of the war.  The inexperience with the 
‘organizational insanity’ of war made it difficult for the junta to deploy III Brigade to the 
Falklands.  This was one of the best units in their military, well trained, well equipped 
and prestigious.  The question raised is why the Argentine leadership chose to “send 
conscripts from Argentina’s tropical zone to the Falklands instead of those trained for 
winter fighting?”200  The stated explanation of the Junta for not sending these troops to 
the Falklands was the need to defend against possible aggression by Chile in the Beagle 
Channel.  However, this explanation seems very weak considering that a recent Papal 
ruling had granted Chile almost all the territory that it sought in the region without having 
to resort to military force.  A long Argentine experience with border disputes had 
conditioned the leadership’s thinking to overemphasize the importance of protecting the 
border.  While nearly 100 British ships raced toward their forces in the Falklands, the 
junta continued to see their Chilean neighbors, who had very limited military capacity or 
political credibility available to support a major border incursion, as a significant enough 
threat to leave III Brigade in place.   
Finally, the selection of General Mario Menéndez to command the defense of the 
islands can be explained by Argentina’s limited war culture.  Given that no command had 
existed in the Falklands before they were seized, the junta was free to appoint a 
commander that suited their needs.  They chose Menéndez for his ability to administer 
the islands and keep the peace.  However, when it became clear that war would come, he 
was left in place.  He could have been replaced with a more senior or aggressive officer, 
but he was not.  If the bulk of the fleet and the best available ground troops were not 
risked, why would the very best commanders be?  To some extent Menéndez was 
expendable.  His disgrace or failure was not likely to cause too many reverberations 
within the military polity.  One of the most important decisions of the entire Falklands 
adventure was made on the basis of expediency.   
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B. THE NATURE OF DECISION-MAKING UNDER THE ARGENTINE 
AUTHORITARIAN REGIME: MILITARY POLITY AS CONSTITUENCY 
Military regimes vary enormously in the way in which decision-making is 
structured and, consequently, in how effectively they are able to implement political, 
economic, and social change.201 The same applies to the making of strategic decisions 
during wartime.  In Argentina, the decision-making structure was organized in a way that 
exacerbated a fundamental dimension of limited war culture: opposition to the 
organizational insanity of modern war.  The primary constituency of the junta was the 
senior leadership of the various armed forces.  The three members were beholden to the 
military as a whole and individually to their respective services for their continued 
political power.  The senior leadership of the services, in keeping with limited war 
culture, viewed their personnel and advanced equipment as sources of prestige (to be 
preserved), rather than as resources to be expended in pursuit of victory in war. 
The organization of the Argentine military regime that ruled from 1976 to 1983 
was largely shaped by the military’s negative experience with the preceding period of 
authoritarian rule.  From 1966 to 1970, retired General Juan Carlos Onganía ruled over a 
government in which “most cabinet officials, governors, heads of state banks and 
enterprises, and other important decision makers were civilians or retired military 
officials.” 202  The result was an authoritarian regime in which the military was almost 
entirely excluded from the exercise of power.  When the military returned to power in 
1976, “the rival service chiefs agreed on a ruling formula that guarded against personal 
rulership by providing for the rotation of the presidency and the dispersal of power 
among the services.”203  Thus, the individual services were pitted against each other in a 
battle for political power.  Far beyond a simple competition for resources and prestige, 
they fought over who would exert the most control in the national government.   
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Figure 7.   Galtieri, Anaya and Dozo204 
This governing structure required that the junta retain the support of their 
respective services in order to stay in power.  The speed with which leaders could be 
replaced was certainly a motivating factor for the Galtieri-led junta.  The junta of 
Galtieri’s predecessor Army General Roberto Eduardo Viola Prevedini had been in office 
for less than nine months before being ousted by Galtieri in December of 1981.  Clearly, 
when the military became dissatisfied with the performance of senior leaders, they could 
replace them very quickly.  This forced the members of the junta to take steps to ensure 
that their subordinates supported their continued leadership.  If the military wanted to 
remove the junta, there was no other support base that the junta could turn to.  The 
mechanisms of civilian political power were so emasculated that they were incapable of 
supporting any regime against the wishes of the military.  If these institutions had been 
capable of acting as an alternative to military support, the junta could have sacrificed all 
their forces in the war against Britain and relied on civilian support to protect them from 
the wrath of the military, but this was not the case.   
The preferences of senior military officers thus became critical elements in the 
decision making process.  In the case of Argentina, military leaders sought to maintain 
their institutions intact rather than seeking institutional glory in war.  This is certainly a 
product of the war-fighting culture in which these officers were trained and seasoned.  
Insight into the preferences of these leaders can be found in an analysis of their 
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professional journals.  The focus of the leading Argentine military journal, Revista del 
Círcular Militar, is rarely war fighting.  From 1920 to 1990, only two articles were 
dedicated to a strategic discussion of international war.205  Since 1982, a large volume of 
the articles has been dedicated to discussions of the Falklands War, but this is all post-
event analysis.  In the discussions of the military leaders in a central forum, the most 
commonly examined topic was organization, commanding more than a third of the 
articles.206  Other topics that dominated the professional dialogue of Argentine officers 
were history, technology, scholarship, domestic issues, and communism.  Tactics, 
strategy and war-fighting were so rarely written about that they barely appear in the 
statistics.207  Argentine military officers were not dedicated to developing themselves or 
their institutions for the purpose of winning the nation’s wars.  The military leaders of 
Argentina trained, studied and prepared to maintain and expand their forces, not to fight 
with them.  The forces were not viewed as a means to an end, the tool for obtaining 
victory on the battlefield, but as an end unto themselves.  
In seeking to maintain support from senior military leaders, a series of decisions 
with disastrous effects on the battlefield were made.  The first was Admiral Anaya’s 
decision to withdraw the Navy from the war and keep them safely in port and within 
Argentine territorial waters.  This decision removed a major obstacle for the British and 
was a direct reflection of the need to preserve the Navy’s assets. 
The Argentine navy could have been employed far more effectively, 
especially in concert with air operations against the British fleet.  
However, after the loss of the Belgrano, Admiral Anaya felt compelled to 
keep his fleet ‘in being’, which really meant ‘in port.’208 
It is important to note that the motivation was not the preservation of assets for later 
employment.  The fleet never reemerged and there is no evidence of any plans for them 
to have done so.  Further combat with the British task force would almost certainly have 
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led to additional losses.  These losses may have purchased an opportunity for victory, but 
this was immaterial.  The losses would have reduced the size and prestige of the Navy.  
Subordinate admirals and captains would have seen their commands reduced or 
eliminated.  The devastation of the Argentine fleet, no matter what the outcome of the 
war would have made it all but impossible for Anaya to maintain the Navy’s support for 
his position.  Instead of the likely benefit to the nation driving this decision, the 
importance of not losing the support of naval commanders was paramount.  It is 
interesting to note that in the run up to the British landings, Anaya “remained committed 
to defending the Falklands, regardless of the further cost in lives and equipment,” but was 
much less enthusiastic about his “own force” being the one to pay that cost.209    
A similar course of events occurred regarding the Argentine Air Force.  On May 
1, the Argentines launched 40 sorties in response to the first major British air and naval 
strikes against targets in and around Stanley.210  Three Argentine aircraft were shot down 
and “Argentine fighters would never again attempt to engage in air-to-air combat.”211  
Admiral Anaya had given the British default sea control with the naval withdrawal and 
now General Dozo did much the same thing with the refusal to dogfight with the British.  
British aircraft were now freed to operate primarily as hunters, trying to kill the 
Argentine planes that flew out to attack the amphibious force as it conducted the 
landings.  To be sure, the Argentine Air Force was able to inflict significant damage on   
British shipping.  However, every time attack aircraft took to the skies, they were subject 
to preying by the Harriers, because no assets were employed to stop the British fighters.  
Like the decision by Anaya, this was also driven by General Dozo’s need to retain the 
support of the Air Force’s senior leadership.  Bombing runs, which involved an aircraft 
conducting an attack and then immediately moving out of the battle area and returning to 
base, could inflict damage on the enemy and allow the attacking aircraft to safely return 
                                                 
209  Lawrence Freedman makes this argument based on British intelligence analysis.  See Freedman, 
The Official History of the Falklands Campaign:  The 1982 Falklands War and it's Aftermath, (London: 
Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2005), 458. 
210  Jeffry L. Huber, "The Falklands Air War. Lessons Revisited" (United States Naval War College, 
1995), 10. 
211  Ibid., 10. 
 55
to its base.  In contrast, once a dogfight was joined, it became a fight to the death; either 
the British or the Argentine pilot would end up in the water.  The possibility of escape 
made attacks on shipping more appealing to the leadership of the Air Force than 
dogfights.  The leadership of the Air Force felt that they could mitigate some of the risks 
of the war by “the withholding of the most vital organizational assets.”212   
 
Figure 8.   500 pound bomb explodes onboard HMS Antelope213 
C. INTER-SERVICE RIVALRY  
Inter-service rivalry is often cited as a critical factor in the Argentine defeat in the 
Falklands.214    The military leadership of Argentina was a fractured threesome that 
reflected a much longer history of rivalry between the three services.  Even in an era 
before the emergence of ‘jointness’ as a preeminent concept in military doctrine, the three 
distinct services in Argentina exhibited a remarkably low level of cooperation.  In the 
official British history of the campaign, Sir Lawrence Freedman observes that the 
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Argentines were plagued by “inter-service squabbling, a highly stratified command 
structure with little vertical bonding, and poor command and control.”215  Throughout the 
war, there were issues among the Argentine forces regarding the appropriate assignment 
of “roles and responsibilities.”216  The Argentine armed forces were “divided into 
watertight compartments, each service jealously guarding its rights and privileges.”217  It 
is argued that this extreme compartmentalization was especially detrimental to the efforts 
in the Falklands.  An adequate defense against the British assault required the 
coordination of air, naval and ground assets to deny air and sea control and then oppose 
the landing force.  However, this coordination never emerged and the result was “the 
Argentine army, navy and air force fought three wars against the British in the 
Malvinas.”218 
The case of the airfield at Stanley is a perfect example.  Despite the later British 
demonstration that the runway could be extended to accommodate A-4 Skyhawks and 
other high performance aircraft, the Argentines never even attempted to base front-line 
fixed wing aircraft there.   
Some evidence exists that the FAA refused to base out of the islands 
because it would have come under some degree of navy operational 
control.  Indeed, Admiral Carlos Büsser, who led the invasion, points out 
the FAA pilots rebelled at this notion, even to the point of refusing 
instruction from naval aviators in how to attack ships at sea.219 
   
 Although it is true that a gross lack of coordination between the Argentine forces 
occurred at the operational and tactical levels, this was not decisive in explaining 
Argentina’s ultimate defeat.  Instead, the larger strategic decisions regarding employment 
of forces made jointly by the junta and by its individual members – described in the 
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preceding sections -- meant that no subsequent amount of coordination between forces 
could have achieved a victory. 
The decision-making process and limited war culture described in this chapter 
clearly encouraged and enabled the individual services to make strategic decisions that 
protected service interests.  Contrary to conventional inter-service rivalry, however, the 
Argentine services were not competing for the lion’s share of glory in war (and the 
resulting resources that would go to the service that proved itself most competent).   
Instead, within a limited war culture environment, each service took a defensive stance to 
preserve their forces and avoid engagement in a total war.  Historical experience shows 
that services with a total war focus can overcome rivalries in pursuit of a shared goal 
(victory in war).  For example, in World War II the rivalry between the United States 
Army and Navy was an issue in the Pacific campaign.  However, evidence exists showing 
that both General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz, each larger than life 
figures in the Army and Navy respectively, subjugated their own interests and the 
interests of their services to the larger mission.220  In contrast, services with a limited war 
culture have no such shared goal.  And in the Argentine case, the military’s relative 
marginalization from government under the previous authoritarian regime led them to 
institutionalize a decision-making process under the military junta that practically 
guaranteed service interests would override the national interest.      
D. CONCLUSION 
The decisions made by the Argentine leadership with regard to the conduct of the 
war in the South Atlantic directly affected the outcome of combat operations.  Contrary 
to conventional wisdom, inter-service rivalry and lack of coordination were not the 
primary causes of defeat in the Falklands.  The war had already been lost by the time lack 
of coordination began to have battlefield effect.   A limited-war culture dominated the 
thinking of the members of the junta and other senior military leaders.  The strength of 
the military constituency reinforced the ideas of this culture by pressuring the junta to 
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conform to the desires of the military.  The members of the junta had governed within a 
limited-war culture that emphasized domestic enemies of the state, involved only a small 
segment of the population and developed institutions that were ill-prepared to deal with 
the realities of modern warfare.  The overall decision making environment produced 
decisions that directly contributed to military defeat in the Falklands.  As the next chapter 
will show, the link between the context in which decisions are made and the battlefield 
provides a valuable opportunity that military and political leaders may be able to exploit 







V. SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Finally, since all decisions must be made in the face of uncertainty and 
since every situation is unique, there is no perfect solution to any 
battlefield problem.  
   U.S. Marine Corps Doctrine Publication One221 
 
 
The Falklands War was short, just one hundred days, but its lessons and effects 
are numerous.  In the aftermath of the conflict, the Galtieri-led junta was toppled and 
Argentina began movement toward democratic governance.  British military capacity, 
once the hegemonic force that dominated the planet, had waned in the decades since 
World War II, but still proved to be a potent force with global reach.  In addition, 
Margaret Thatcher rose to become a key leader in the final years of the Cold War.  
Militarily, the lessons learned were most relevant to expeditionary warfare.  The British 
had accomplished what many thought was impossible, but was at the very heart of United 
States Navy and Marine Corps training and doctrine.  On the other hand, the Argentine 
debacle revealed the power of the environment in which decisions are made to influence 
combat operations.   
A.  SUMMARY 
The long-standing dispute over rightful ownership of the Falkland Islands remains 
unresolved.  Beginning with the British occupation in 1833, Great Britain and Argentina 
have been unable to resolve this conflict.  When this disagreement flashed into armed 
conflict in 1982, the result was a short and bloody war.  The British operated at a distinct 
disadvantage in terms of geography.  The task force sailed nearly 8,000 miles to reach the 
theater of war and operated more than 3,000 miles from the nearest base.  Meanwhile, 
Argentine forces were close enough to the mainland to operate under an umbrella of 
fixed-wing aircraft operating from their home bases.  Argentina also had dramatic 
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numerical edges in aircraft available and forces on the ground.  Additionally, a 
moderately sized, yet capable navy, armed with cutting-edge weaponry, was available for 
tasking.  Further solidifying the Argentine position was the coming Southern winter.  The 
onset of foul weather would make the proposed British operations all but impossible.  
Without serious mistakes by senior officers, the Argentines were well-positioned to win 
the war and hold onto the Islands.  However, serious errors were made by senior leaders 
and those errors served to undermine all of the leverage enjoyed by Argentina at the 
commencement of hostilities.  A war which, on paper, looked like it should have been 
won by Argentina turned into what appeared to be a rather easy British victory. 
Mismanagement of the war by Argentina began even before the British task force 
arrived in the South Atlantic.  Well-trained soldiers of III Brigade, equipped for winter 
fighting, were not deployed to the Islands.   The opportunity to lengthen the airfield at 
Stanley allowing for the forward deployed operation of front line aircraft was not taken.  
Things did not improve once operations began.  One submarine was lost conducting a 
tertiary logistics mission and the other was never ordered to target the enemy center of 
gravity, the two British aircraft carriers.  Special Forces were used primarily as military 
police and never released to conduct significant action against the British landing force.  
Additionally, the Argentine air campaign was disorganized and, despite damaging a 
significant number of British ships, failed to land any blows that seriously affected 
Admiral Woodward’s plan.  Finally, the defense of the islands, coveted for nearly 150 
years was placed in the hands of a general not known for combat effectiveness, but 
appointed primarily as a civil administrator.  The result of all these decisions was a 
campaign that focused on risk avoidance at the cost of combat effectiveness.  
Simply establishing that bad decisions made by the junta caused the battlefield 
defeat of Argentine forces does not add much to the analysis of the conflict.  
Understanding why these decisions were made is much more important.  The thinking of 
the junta members was shaped by a long-standing ‘Limited War Culture’, which was 
reinforced by their beholdenness to the senior leadership of each service, who themselves 
were guided by the risk-averseness that characterizes limited war culture.  Unable to 
unify the three military branches, even in the midst of a war, the service chiefs were 
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primarily, if not exclusively concerned with preserving their own positions in the junta 
and hence their own forces.  These divisions were reinforced by the fact that the leaders 
were not beholden to any civilian body; their constituency was comprised entirely of 
other military officers.  Thus, Anaya withdrew the fleet and Dozo refused to engage in 
air-to-air combat with the British.  The net result of these decisions was the surrender of 
sea control and enough air supremacy for the amphibious landings to be carried out 
effectively.  The war-fighting culture of Argentina, reflecting the broader historical 
trajectory of Latin America, had developed leaders whose strategic perspective left them 
ill-prepared to fight a nation that had a long, bellicose history and that played a front-line 
role in NATO.  Events unfolded so quickly that the Argentine military had no time to 
change or rethink existing ideas regarding limited engagements, domestic security and 
border disputes.  Thus, the best troops for the mission were not deployed, valuable assets 
in the form of submarines and Special Forces were underemployed and an historic quest 
for las Islas Malvinas was placed in the hands of a leader chosen for his prowess at 
establishing law and order. 
B.  IMPLICATIONS 
Beyond what has already been discussed, two implications drawn from this 
analysis seem particularly important.  First, preparation and positioning before the onset 
of a crisis are pivotal.  In the British case, NATO training exercises, an officer corps 
grounded in an historical legacy of expeditionary warfare and ability to suffer combat 
losses without compromising the mission paved the road to victory.  In the Argentine 
case, a military used primarily for regional posturing and domestic repression, combined 
with a leadership that was highly sensitive to combat losses for political reasons and that 
articulated a ‘theory of victory’ that could not be molded to fit the current crisis, led 
inexorably to defeat.  In relation to both military establishments and their leadership, the 
battle for the Falklands did not last long enough for serious changes to any of these 
factors to be made.  The lesson is that in conflicts of short duration there will not be any 
opportunity to radically shift the direction of either the military or the national leadership.   
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The fight will have to be conducted with what is available, physically and intellectually.  
In this case, the British were positioned to win and, despite their numerous advantages on 
paper, the Argentines were positioned to lose. 
The second conclusion is that the value of technology on the modern battlefield is 
relative.  Argentina had highly advanced technology available for employment by their 
forces:  high-technology fighter and attack aircraft, ultra-quiet German diesel submarines 
and the devastating Exocet anti-ship missile.  On the other side, the British had the new 
variant of the Sidewinder missile, two aged, but still powerful aircraft carriers and 
nuclear-powered submarines.  The difference was that the British technology was 
employed against the perceived weaknesses of the Argentines.  Their submarines 
attacked a very old ship and sent the Argentine fleet running for shore.  The Sidewinder 
demolished aircraft which had little chance to engage in dog fighting since they were 
operating at the edge of their fuel capacity and the carriers enabled the British to place 
their Harrier jump-jets in close proximity to the islands.  This latter factor was of 
particular importance because despite the Argentines’ occupation of the island they did 
not forward deploy aircraft there.  On the Argentine side, their technological advantage in 
some areas (or at least parity) was blunted by the strength of the British or by their own 
misdirection of their capabilities.  For example, Argentina’s front-line aircraft 
consistently flew into the teeth of air defense ships and Harriers, instead of attacking 
Britain’s more vulnerable supply ships, amphibious transports and carriers.  Likewise, 
Argentine submarine operations targeted British combat vessels and made no attempts to 
strike at the softer targets.  After the war, a British SAS officer remarked that the 
Argentines suffered from the same problem that “afflicts many Third World armies, of 
concentrating on acquiring expensive technology rather than applying basic training and 
skills.”222 
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C. GENERALIZABILITY OF THE FINDINGS 
The applicability of conclusions across a broader group of cases depends on 
several factors being present: limited war culture and an authoritarian regime in which 
key strategic decisions are made by leaders responsive to a fragmented military 
constituency steeped in a limited war culture.  Even among nations that meet these 
criteria, these factors will only be relevant if national-level decision-making has an 
impact on the battlefield.  They will not be relevant where battlefield performance is 
primarily a product of military capabilities operating independent of orders.  That is, if 
the forces are not sufficiently trained, equipped and positioned to achieve combat victory 
then examination of decision-making is of little value.  Second, if national leaders are so 
far removed from the fight, or battlefield events outpace their decision making process to 
the extent that their decisions have little or no impact on the conduct of the war itself, 
then it makes little sense to examine the factors that shape national-level decision 
making. 
Future research on this subject might fruitfully focus on three areas.  First, to what 
extent has limited war culture led to defeat on the battlefield for countries other than 
Argentina?  Wars that are most like the Falklands War are a good starting point for 
further analysis.  These would include wars of a short-duration, with a decisive victory by 
one side, and the losing side being a nation with an authoritarian regime.  Wars where the 
victory is less than decisive are problematic because the closer run the contest is, the 
more operational and tactical decisions, luck and small unit performance overshadow 
broader national-level decisions in shaping the outcome.  Good candidates for study are 
the Suez War of 1956, the Six-Day War of 1967, the Yom Kippur War of 1973, the Gulf 
War of 1991 and the opening chapter of the Gulf War of 2003.   
Second, to what extent does the structure of decision-making within an 
authoritarian regime shape the relative influence that a limited war culture exerts over 
decision makers?  In the Argentine case, the responsiveness of the junta leaders to the 
risk averse senior leadership in the individual services was a key factor determining the 
overall influence that limited war culture had.  Would we expect the limited war culture 
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of the military leadership to exert a similar influence over strategic decision-making in 
authoritarian regimes that are civilian in nature or that have a contentious relationship 
with the military? 
Third, to what extent can regime type mitigate the effects of war-fighting culture?  
A comparative study of the impact that limited-war culture has in democratic regimes 
vice those that are authoritarian in nature would explore the relationship between war-
fighting culture, regime type and battlefield outcomes.  Are democratic regimes better 
able to respond to situations in which the prevailing concepts regarding military action 
are insufficient?  It is likely that regime type will have more of an impact in conflicts of 
longer duration, when democratic processes would have more of a chance to influence 
outcomes.  Related to this, it is important to determine the mechanism through which 
regime type influences outcomes.  In particular, to what extent does public opinion shape 
the tactics and operations employed in war?    
D. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The primary recommendation that flows from this study involves the importance 
of exploiting the political situation at the lowest possible level of command.  In war, 
perfect information will never be available to national leaders or military commanders.  
Nevertheless, what political information is available should be distributed as far down the 
operational chain of command as possible.  Experts on the political situation of the 
enemy should be available at the operational and tactical levels wherever possible.  The 
reason for this is simple: exploitation of battlefield situations can have a dramatic impact 
on the overall conduct of the war.  Two particular examples illustrate this point.  The first 
is the sinking of the General Belgrano by HMS Conqueror.  The fractured nature of the 
junta and the importance of avoiding devastating casualties for Admiral Anaya made the 
sinking much more pivotal than its tactical value would indicate.  A commander who had 
some understanding of the situation would be more aggressive and take greater risks to 
ensure the sinking occurred.  As it was, the impact of destroying a single enemy vessel 
was not foreseen.  In this case, the British were lucky.  They did not attack the Belgrano 
with the intent of forcing the Argentine Navy to retreat, but this was the result.  The 
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removal of the entire Argentine fleet from further combat operations would have been 
well worth the loss of Conqueror if that had been the cost required.   Operational 
commanders should seek out the opportunity for military blows that yield non-linear 
impacts through political ramifications.  The second case involves the encounter between 
the British Harriers and Argentina’s FAA forces on May 1.  Inflicting one day of air-to-
air losses on the Argentines caused them to avoid this type of fight for the balance of the 
war.  A British commander with a greater awareness of the centrality of limited war 
culture to Argentine decision-making would have risked a large number of assets and 
pressed the attack harder in order to eliminate air-to-air threats for the remainder of the 
campaign.  War is fluid and unpredictable.  Tactical encounters with strategic effects can 
be better exploited if leaders at the tactical level can appreciate the larger effects that their 
actions could precipitate. 
The dominant lesson to emerge from this analysis is that the environment in 
which decisions at the highest levels of government are made can have a decisive 
influence on combat operations.  It is possible to analyze and critique decisions at 
different levels of command, but the impacts of these decisions will rarely be so nicely 
contained.  In the early twenty-first century, military leaders should view political 
intelligence as a tool with value equal to intelligence on enemy capabilities and 
limitations.  In the case of the Falklands War, British military action was predominantly 
in accordance with their existing doctrine, but they were fortunate that this doctrine 
aligned well against the weaknesses of the Argentine state and its defense forces.   
As the Argentine case highlights, detailed post-conflict analysis and access to 
classified material is not necessary for an understanding of the factors that shape 
national-level decision-making.  The broad strokes of a nation’s strategy are usually 
easily accessible and the mechanisms of its government well-known.  Diplomats, 
intelligence specialists and military analysts could have determined the nature of the 
Argentine war-fighting culture (as well as the responsiveness of the junta leaders to the 
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